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POLYNOMIAL-TIME KEY RECOVERY ATTACK ON THE FAURE-LOIDREAU
SCHEME BASED ON GABIDULIN CODES
PHILIPPE GABORIT, AYOUB OTMANI, AND HERVE´ TALE´ KALACHI
ABSTRACT. Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of order of
few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature compared to Hamming metric-based
encryption schemes where public key sizes are of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with
additional structures like the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in
rank metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin codes. Since the
original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov, many systems have been
proposed based on different masking techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years most
of these systems were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck.
In 2005 Faure and Loidreau designed a rank-metric encryption scheme which was not in theMcEliece
setting. The scheme is very efficient, with small public keys of size a few kiloBytes and with security
closely related to the linearized polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decod-
ing problem of Gabidulin codes. The structure of the scheme differs considerably from the classical
McEliece setting and until our work, the scheme had never been attacked. We show in this article that
for a range of parameters, this scheme is also vulnerable to a polynomial-time attack that recovers the
private key by applying Overbeck’s attack on an appropriate public code. As an example we break in a
few seconds parameters with 80-bit security claim. Our work also shows that some parameters are not
affected by our attack but at the cost of a lost of efficiency for the underlying schemes.
Post-quantum cryptography; Gabidulin code; Polynomial reconstruction; Faure-Loidreau scheme.
1. INTRODUCTION
McEliece encryption setting. Post-quantum cryptography aims at proposing schemes that resist to an
hypothetical quantum computer. It represents more and more a serious alternative to classical cryp-
tography based on the discrete logarithm problem and the factorization problem. McEliece opened the
way to code-based cryptography by proposing the first post-quantum (public-key encryption) scheme
[McE78]. The McEliece cryptosystem is in fact an encryption setting which relies on the hiding
of particular class of decodable codes. The algorithmic assumption underlying the security is the
difficulty of solving the closest vector problem with the Hamming metric for the particular class of
masked decodable codes on which the scheme relies. Over the years many variants of the McEliece
cryptosystem were proposed with different families of codes, and many were broken by recovering
the structure of the masked codes. However the original family of codes, the binary Goppa codes,
proposed by McEliece essentially remains unattacked. The resistance to structural attacks, which try
to recover the structure of the masked codes, is the main potential weakness of this setting. For in-
stance the highly structured Reed-Solomon codes are difficult to mask and most of McEliece variants
relying on Reed-Solomon codes or variations on Reed-Solomon codes have been broken.
Rank metric cryptography. The McEliece cryptosystem setting is very versatile and only needs a
decodable family of codes along with a particular masking technique of codes. Hence this approach
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can also be used with another metric than the classical Hamming metric. An important metric emerg-
ing in cryptography is the rank metric which considers the ambient space Fab where F is a (finite)
field and a and b are positive integers, as the space of a × b matrices so that we can associate the
rank to any vector from Fab. By viewing any finite extension of finite fields F/K as a linear space
over K of dimension m > 1 then for any positive integer n, the ambient space Fn can also be viewed
as the space of m × n matrices. In [GPT91] Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov proposed the first
rank-metric based encryption scheme. This scheme can be seen as an analog of the McEliece’s one
but based on the class of Gabidulin codes.
The main interest of the rank metric is that the time complexity of best known generic attacks for rank
metric grows faster regarding the size of parameters, than for Hamming metric. In practice, without
additional structure like cyclicity, it means that it is possible to obtain public key sizes for rank metric
of only a few thousand bytes, when hundred of thousand bytes are needed for Hamming metric.
An important operation in the key generation of the GPT cryptosystem is the masking phase where
the secret Gabidulin code G undergoes a transformation to mask its inherent algebraic structure. This
transformation is a probabilistic algorithm that adds some randomness to its input G . Originally, the
authors in [GPT91] proposed to use a distortion transformation that outputs (a generator matrix of)
the code G + R where R is random code with a prescribed dimension tR. The presence of R has
however an impact: the sender has to add an error vector whose rank weight is tpub = t− tR where
t is the error correction capability of the G . Hence, roughly speaking, the hiding phase publishes a
degraded code in terms of error correction.
Gabidulin codes are often seen as equivalent of Reed-Solomon codes because, like them, they are
highly structured. That is the reason why their use in the GPT cryptosystem has been the subject to
several attacks. Gibson was the first to prove the weakness of the system through a series of successful
attacks [Gib95, Gib96]. Following these failures, the first works which modified the GPT scheme to
avoid Gibson’s attack were published in [GO01, GOHA03]. The idea is to hide further the structure of
Gabidulin code by considering isometries for the rank metric. Consequently, a right column scrambler
P is introduced which is an invertible matrix with its entries in the base field Fq while the ambient
space of the Gabidlun code is Fnqm . But Overbeck designed in [Ove05b, Ove05a, Ove08] a more
general attack that dismantled all the existing modified GPT cryptosystems. His approach consists
in applying an operator Λi which applies i times the Frobenius operation on the public generator
matrix Gpub. The dimension increases by 1 each time the Frobenius is applied. Therefore by taking
i = n − k − 1 the codimension becomes 1 if k is the rank of Gpub. This phenomenon is a clearly
distinguishing property of a Gabidulin code which cannot be encountered for instance with a random
linear code where the dimension would increase by k for each use of the Frobenius operator.
Overbeck’s attack uses crucially two important facts, namely the column scrambler matrix P is de-
fined on the based field Fq and the codimension of Λn−k−1 (Gpub) is equal to 1. Several works then
proposed to resist to this attack either by taking special random codes R so that the second property
is not true as in [Loi10, RGH10], or by taking a column scrambler matrix defined over the extension
field Fqm as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11].
But recently in [OTKN16] it was shown that even if the column scrambler is defined on the extension
field as in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11], by using precisely Overbeck’s technique, it is still possible to
recover very efficiently a secret Gabidulin code whose error correction t∗ is certainly strictly less than
the error correction of the secret original Gabidiulin code but still strictly greater than the number of
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added errors tpub. In other words, an attacker is still able to decrypt any ciphertext and consequently,
all schemes based on Gabidulin codes presented in [Gab08, GRH09, RGH11] are actually not secure.
Faure-Loidreau’s approach. Besides the McEliece setting used with Gabidulin codes, Faure and
Loidreau proposed in [FL05] another approach for designing rank-metric encryption scheme based
on Gabidulin codes. The scheme was supposed to be secure under the assumption that the problem
of the linearized polynomial reconstruction1 is intractable. This scheme follows the works done in
[AF03, AFL03] where a public-key encryption scheme is defined that relies on the polynomial recon-
struction problem which corresponds to the decoding problem of Reed-Solomon codes. The Polyno-
mial Reconstruction (PR) consists in solving the following problem: given two n-tuples (z1, . . . , zn)
and (y1, . . . , yn) and parameters [n, k,w], recover all polynomials P of degree less than k such that
P (zi) = yi for at most w distinct indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The public key is then a noisy random
codeword from a Reed-Solomon code where the (Hamming) weight of the error is greater than the
decoding capability of the Reed-Solomon code. However the schemes have undergone polynomial-
time attacks in [Cor03, Cor04, KY04]. The authors in [FL05] proposed an analog of Augot-Finiasz
scheme but in the rank-metric context. The security of [FL05] is related to the difficulty of solving
p-polynomial reconstruction corresponding actually to the decoding problem of a Gabidulin code be-
yond its error-correcting capability. After Overbeck’s attack, parameters proposed in [FL05] were
updated in [Loi07, Chap. 7] in order to resist to it.
Our results.We show in this article that the Faure-Loidreau scheme is vulnerable to a structural
polynomial-time attack that recovers the private key from the public key. Based in part on the security
analysis given in [Loi07, Chap. 7], we show that by applying Overbeck’s attack on an appropriate
public code an attacker can recover the private key very efficiently, only assuming a mild condition on
the code, which was always true in all our experimentations.
Informally, the Faure-Loidreau encryption scheme considers three finite fields Fq ⊂ Fqm ⊂ L. The
rank weight of vectors is computed over the field Fq. The public key is then composed of a Gabidulin
code of dimension k of length n defined by a matrix G = (gi,j) with gi,j ∈ F
n
qm and K = xG + z
where x is some vector in Lk and z is a vector of Ln with (rank) weight w > 12 (n− k). Both vectors
x and z have to be kept secret but from attacker’s point of view the private key is essentially x since
z can be deduced from it.
Our attack uses the Frobenius operator, introduced by Overbeck, which takes as input any vector space
U ⊆ Fnqm and integer i > 1 in order to construct the vector space Λi(U) defined as
Λi(U) = U + U
q + · · · + U q
i
.
The first step of the attack considers a basis γ1, . . . , γu of L viewed as a vector space over Fqm of
dimension u > 1 and defines the vectors vi = TrL/Fqm (γiz). Our main result shows that the system
can be broken in polynomial time and can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1. If the Fqm-vector space generated by v1, . . . ,vu denoted by V satisfies the property
dimΛn−w−k−1(V ) = w (1)
then the private key (x, z) can be recovered from (G,K) with O(n3) operations in the field L.
Notice that if V behaves as random code then generally the condition (1) holds. We implemented our
attack on parameters given in [FL05, Loi07] for 80-bit security, which were broken in a few seconds.
1In [FL05] the problem is termed as p-polynomial reconstruction problem.
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A necessary condition for (1) to be true is to choose u(n− w − k) > w that is to say
w 6
u
u+ 1
(n− k) .
This was always the case for parameters proposed in [FL05, Loi07].
Related work. The attack presented in this paper is very similar to the approach proposed in [LO06]
where the authors seek to decode several noisy codewords of a Gabidulin code. Let us assume that
we received ℓ words z1, . . . , zℓ from F
n
qm where each zi is written as zi = ci + ei with ci belong-
ing to a Gabidulin code G of dimension k and length n over Fqm and the ei’s are vectors from
F
n
qm . Let us denote by E the matrix of size ℓ × n formed by the ei’s and let |E|q be the dimen-
sion of the Fq-vector space generated by the columns of E. The authors show that when |E|q 6
ℓ
ℓ+1 (n− k) then Overbeck’s technique recovers in O(n
3) operations the codewords c1, . . . , cℓ. It
therefore provides a method that decodes a Gabidulin code beyond the classical error-correcting
limit 12 (n− k). This approach can be used here to attack the Faure-Loidreau scheme [FL05] be-
cause the vectors TrL/Fqm (γ1K), . . . ,TrL/Fqm (γuK) can be written as c1 + v1, . . . , cu + vu where
ci = TrL/Fqm (γix)G belong to the Gabidulin generated by G and the u × n matrix V formed by
v1, . . . ,vu satisfy |V|q = w which in turn has to verify w 6
u
u+1 (n− k).
Organisation. In Section 2 notation and important notions useful for our paper are given. Gabidulin
codes are recalled in 3. In Section 4 we present the Faure-Loidreau scheme and in Section 5 we
describe in full details our attack against it.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Vectors from Fn where F is a field are denoted by boldface letters as a = (a1, . . . , an). The con-
catenation of two vectors u and v is denoted by (u | v). The set of matrices with entries in F having
m rows and n columns is denoted by Mm,n (F) and the subset of n × n invertible matrices form
the general linear group denoted by GLn(F). A linear code C of length n over a field F is a linear
subspace of Fn. An element of a code is called a codeword and a matrix whose rows form a basis is
called a generator matrix. The dual of a code C ⊂ Fn is the linear space denoted by C⊥ containing
vectors z ∈ Fn such that:
∀c ∈ C , 〈c, z〉 =
n∑
i=1
cizi = 0.
Any generator matrix of C⊥ is called a parity-check matrix of C .
The finite field with q elements is denoted by Fq where q is a power of a prime number p. The trace
operator of Fqm over Fq is the Fq-linear map TrFqm/Fq : Fqm −→ Fq defined for any x in Fqm by
TrFqm/Fq (x) = x+ x
q + · · · + xq
m−1
.
Let B = {b1, . . . , bm} be a basis of Fqm over Fq. The dual basis, or also called the trace orthogonal
basis ofB is a basis B∗ = {b∗1, . . . , b
∗
m} of Fqm over Fq such that for any i and j in {1 . . . ,m}
TrFqm/Fq(bib
∗
j) = δi,j
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where δi,i = 1 and δi,j = 0 when i 6= j. Note that there always exits a dual basis and furthermore it
is possible to express any α from Fqm as
α =
m∑
i=1
TrFqm/Fq(αb
∗
i )bi. (2)
Any univariate polynomial f ∈ Fqm [X] of the form f0 + f1X
q + · · · + fkX
qd where 0 6 d < m is
a called a q-linearised polynomial and d is its q-degree.
Any map h : U → V is naturally extended to vectors x ∈ Un by h(x) = (h(x1), . . . , h(xn)). This
applies in particular to the cases where h is a polynomial or is the Frobenius (and trace) operator. For
any subsets U ⊂ Fn and V ⊂ Fn the notation U + V represents the set {u+ v | u ∈ U and v ∈ V }.
For any subfield K ⊆ F and x form Fn the K-vector space generated by x is denoted by Kx. For any
U ⊂ Fn and for any P ∈ GLn(K) the notation UP is used to denote the set {uP | u ∈ U}. For any
subset V ⊆ Fnqm and any integer i > 0 we define V
qi as the set of vectors vq
i
= (vq
i
1 , . . . , v
qi
n ) where
v describes V . Note that when V is a vector space then V q
i
is also a linear subspace of Fnqm .
Definition 2. The rank weight of x ∈ Fnqm denoted by |x|q is the dimension of the Fq-vector space
generated by {x1, . . . , xn}, or equivalently
|x|q = dim
n∑
i=1
Fqxi. (3)
Note that for any x ∈ Fn with |x|q = w there exists P in GLn(Fq) and x
∗ ∈ Fwqm such that xP =
(x∗ | 0) and |x∗|q = w.
Finally, an algorithm D : Fn → C is said to decode t errors in a code C ⊂ Fn if for any c ∈ C and
for any e ∈ Fn such that |e|q 6 t we have D(c+ e) = c. Generally, we call such a vector e an error
vector.
3. GABIDULIN CODES
We now introduce an important family of codes known for having an efficient decoding algorithm for
the rank metric.
Definition 3 (Gabidulin code). Let g in Fnqm such that |g|q = n. The Gabidulin code Gk (g) of length
n and dimension k is the Fqm-linear subspace of F
n
qm defined by
Gk (g) =
{
f(g) | f = f0 + f1X
q + · · · + fkX
qk−1 ∈ Fqm [X]
}
. (4)
Equivalently, a generator matrix of Gk (g) is given by G where
G =


g1 · · · gn
gq1 · · · g
q
n
...
...
gq
k−1
1 · · · g
qk−1
n

 . (5)
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Gabidulin codes are known to possess a fast decoding algorithm that can decode errors of weight t
provided that t 6 ⌊12 (n − k)⌋. Furthermore the dual of a Gabidulin code Gk (g) is also a Gabidulin
code (see for instance [Gab85, GPT91, Ber03]).
Proposition 4. The dual of Gk (g) is the Gabidulin code Gn−k
(
hq
−(n−k−1)
)
where h belongs to
Gn−1 (g)
⊥
and |h|q = n.
We also have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any P in GLn(Fq) and for any Gabidulin code Gk (g) ⊂ F
n
qm with |g|q = n then
Gk (g)P = Gk (gP) . (6)
Proof. The proof of this proposition comes directly from the fact that for any positive integer i, and
for any P in GLn(Fq),
(gP)q
i
= gq
i
P

We gather important algebraic properties about Gabidulin codes in order to explain why many attacks
occur when the underlying code is a Gabidulin code Gk (g). One key property is that Gabidulin codes
can be easily distinguished from random linear codes. This singular behaviour has been precisely
exploited by Overbeck [Ove05b, Ove05a, Ove08] to mount attacks. For that purpose we introduce the
operator Λi defined for any linear vector subspace U ⊆ F
n
qm by
Λi(U) = U + U
q + · · · + U q
i
. (7)
This operator can also be defined over matrices in an obvious manner. For instance a generator matrix
of Gk (g) is Λk−1(g). This implies in particular the next proposition.
Proposition 6. For any i > 0, Λi (Gk (g)) = Gk+i (g) which implies in particular that
dimΛi (Gk (g)) = min{k + i, n}.
The importance of Proposition 6 becomes clear when we compare it to the case of random codes.
Proposition 7. Let A ⊂ Fnqm be a code generated by a randomly drawn matrix from Mk,n (Fqm)
then with a high probability
dimΛi(A ) = min
{
(i+ 1)k, n
}
(8)
Remark 8. Another way of understanding the previous proposition is to observe that if A is random
code then dimA ∩A q = 0 whereas for Gabidulin codes we would obtain
dimGk (g) ∩ Gk (g)
q = k − 2.
Thus there is property that can be computed in polynomial time such that it distinguishes between a
Gabidulin code and a random code. This important fact has been used successfully in the cryptanalysis
of several encryption schemes [COT14, CGG+14, OTK15].
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4. FAURE-LOIDREAU ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Key generation. Throughout this step, besides the fields Fq and Fqm , another field L is considered
where L is the extension of Fqm of degree u > 1, and three integers k, n and w such that u < k < n
and
n− k > w >
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
. (9)
(1) Pick at random g ∈ Fnqm with |g|q = n and let G ∈ Mk,n (Fqm) be the generator matrix of
Gk (g) ⊂ F
n
qm as in (5)
(2) Pick at random x ∈ Lk such that {xk−u+1, . . . , xk} form a basis of L over Fqm
(3) Generate randomly s ∈ Lw with |s|q = w and P ∈ GLn(Fq) and then compute z ∈ L
n
defined as
z = (s | 0)P−1. (10)
The private key is (x,P) and the public key is (g, k,K, tpub) where
K = xG+ z and tpub =
⌊
n− w − k
2
⌋
. (11)
Encryption. A plaintext here is a vector m = (m1, . . . ,mk) belonging to F
k
qm such that mi = 0
when i ∈ {k − u+ 1, . . . , k}. To encrypt then m one randomly generates α ∈ L and e ∈ Fnqm such
that |e|q 6 tpub. The ciphertext is the vector c ∈ F
n
qm defined by
c = mG+TrL/Fqm (αK) + e. (12)
Decryption. The receiver computes first cP that is to say
cP = mGP+TrL/Fqm
(
αxGP + αzP
)
+ eP (13)
=
(
m+TrL/Fqm (αx)
)
GP+
(
TrL/Fqm (αs) | 0
)
+ eP (14)
Let G′ be the k × (n − w) matrix obtained by removing the first w columns of GP and let e′ and c′
be respectively the restriction of eP and cP to the last n− w coordinates. We then have
c′ =
(
m+TrL/Fqm (αx)
)
G′ + e′. (15)
Using the fact that G′ generates a Gabidulin code of length n − w and dimension k < n − w
and since |e′|q 6 |e|q 6 ⌊
1
2 (n − w − k)⌋, it is possible to recover m
′ = m + TrL/Fqm (αx) by
applying a decoding algorithm. Since by construction m ∈ Fkqm is chosen so that mi = 0 when
i ∈ {k−u+1, . . . , k} then by choosing a dual basis {x∗k−u+1, ..., x
∗
k} of {xk−u+1, . . . , xk} the value
of α can be computed as the following
k∑
i=k−u+1
m′ix
∗
i =
k∑
i=k−u+1
TrL/Fqm (αxi)x
∗
i = α.
Once α is recovered, the plaintext m is then equal tom′ −TrL/Fqm (αx).
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5. POLYNOMIAL-TIME KEY RECOVERY ATTACK WHEN w 6 uu+1(n− k)
In this section, we show that it is possible to recover an alternative private key from the public dataK
and G when the condition w 6 uu+1(n− k) holds. We start by remarking that if an attacker A is able
to find a matrix T ∈ GLn(Fq) and z
∗ ∈ Lw such that
zT = (z∗ | 0) and |z∗|q = w
then A can fully recover x ∈ Lk by solving only the last n − w equations of the following linear
system (see Algorithm 1 for more details)
KT = xGT+ (z∗ | 0). (16)
In the sequel, we describe a way to obtain x by finding such a matrix T. The first step is to consider a
basis γ1, . . . , γu of L viewed as a vector space over Fqm of dimension u > 1. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , u}
we set Ki = TrL/Fqm (γiK). Lastly, let Cpub ⊂ F
n
qm be the (public) code generated by K1, . . . ,Ku
and Gk (g), that is to say
Cpub = Gk (g) +
u∑
i=1
FqmKi. (17)
Remark 9. Cpub is defined by the generator matrix Gpub where
Gpub =


G
K1
...
Ku

 (18)
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , u} let us set vi = TrL/Fqm (γiz) and bi =
(
TrL/Fqm (γis) | 0
)
∈ Fnqm . By
construction, we also have the equality
viP = bi. (19)
Lemma 10. Let us define B =
∑m
i=1 Fqmbi then we have
CpubP = Gk (gP) + B.
Proof. Set xi = TrL/Fqm (γix) ∈ F
k
qm . It is sufficient to use Proposition 5 and to observe that
KiP = TrL/Fqm (γix)GP+
(
TrL/Fqm (γis) | 0
)
= xiGP+ bi

Proposition 11. Let f = n− w − k − 1 and assume that dimΛf (B) = w. The code Λf (Cpub)
⊥
is
then of dimension 1 generated by (0 | h)PT where h ∈ Fn−wqm and |h|q = n− w.
Furthermore, for any h˜ ∈ Λf (Cpub)
⊥
with h˜ 6= 0 and for any T ∈ GLn(Fq) such that
h˜(T−1)T =
(
0 | h′
)
(20)
where h′ ∈ Fn−wqm , there exists z
∗ ∈ Fwqm with |z
∗|q = w such that zT = (z
∗ | 0).
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Proof. Let us decompose GP as (L | R) where L ∈ Mk,w (Fqm) and R ∈ Mk,n−w (Fqm). Let
B ∈ Mu,w (Fqm) be the matrix where the i-th row is composed by the w first components of bi.
Note that GpubP where Gpub is defined as in (18) is a generator matrix of CpubP, and the following
equality holds
GpubP =
(
L R
B 0
)
. (21)
Hence Λf (GpubP) = Λf (Gpub)P is a generator matrix of the code Λf (CpubP) = Λf (Cpub)P which
satisfies the equality
Λf (Gpub)P =
(
Λf (L) Λf (R)
Λf (B) 0
)
.
The fact that R generates an (n− w, k)−Gabidulin code implies that
rank (Λf (R)) = k + f = n− w − 1.
Consequently, there exists h ∈ Fn−wqm with |h|q = n − w that satisfies Λf (R)h
T = 0. Furthermore,
the equality dimΛf (B) = Λf (B) holds which implies that
dimΛf (Cpub)P = rank (Λf (B)) + rank (Λf (R)) = k + f + w = n− 1.
This means that (0 | h) generates actually the full space
(
Λf (Cpub)P
)⊥
which is equivalent to say
(0 | h)PT generates Λf (Cpub)
⊥.
For the second part of the proposition, let h˜ be any element from Λf (Cpub)
⊥
with h˜ 6= 0 and let T
be in GLn(Fq) such that (20) holds for some h
′ in Fn−wq . There exists an element α in Fqm such
that h˜ = (0 | αh)PT . Consider matrices A1,A2, A3 and A4 such that A1 ∈ Mw,w (Fq) and
A4 ∈ M(n−w),(n−w) (Fq) so that we have
T−1P =
(
A1 A2
A3 A4
)
.
We have then the following equalities
(0 | h′) = h˜(T−1)T = (0 | αh)PT (T−1)T = (0 | αh)
(
T−1P
)T
(22)
It follows from (22) that hAT2 = 0 and hence A2 = 0 since |h|q = n− w. So we can write
T−1P =
(
A1 0
A3 A4
)
.
We deduce that P−1T =
(
A−11 0
−A−14 A3A
−1
1 A
−1
4
)
=
(
A′ 0
C′ D′
)
and consequently, we get
zT = (s | 0)P−1T = (s | 0)
(
A′ 0
C′ D′
)
=
(
sA′ | 0
)
.
So by letting z∗ = sA′ = sA−11 we have proved the proposition. 
Proposition 11 shows that an equivalent key can be found in polynomial time by simply using a non
zero element of Λf (Cpub)
⊥. We now prove our main result stated in the introduction which shows
the weakness of the system.
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Theorem 1. If the Fqm-vector space generated by v1, . . . ,vu denoted by V satisfies the property
dimΛn−w−k−1(V ) = w
then the private key (x, z) can be recovered from (G,K) with O(n3) operations in the field L
Proof. Firstly, note that from (19) we know that VP = B. Algorithm 1 gives the full description of
the attack and provides a proof of Theorem 1. Indeed, the attack consists in picking any codeword
h˜ from Λn−w−k−1(Cpub)
⊥
and then, by Gaussian elimination, we transform h˜ so that there exists
T ∈ GLn(Fq) for which we have
h˜(T−1)T =
(
0 | h′
)
where h′ ∈ Fn−wqm . From Proposition 11 we know that T is an equivalent key that will gives an
equality of the form (16), and therefore it is possible by solving a linear system to find x. Lastly, the
time complexity comes from the fact the operations involved are essentially Gaussian eliminations
over square matrices with n columns and entries in L. 
An important assumption for the success of the attack is that dimΛn−w−k−1(Cpub)
⊥ = 1 which
was always true in all our experimentations. This assumption is true if and only if the equality
dimΛn−w−k−1(B) = w holds, which implies to have u(n − w − k) > w, or equivalently
w 6
u
u+ 1
(n− k). (23)
Assuming that B behaves as a random code then dimΛn−w−k−1(B) = w would hold with high
probability as long as (23) is true. The parameters proposed in [Loi07] satisfy (23). Furthermore, the
analysis given in [Loi07] implies to take u > 3. We implemented the attack with Magma V2.21-6 and
the secret key x was found in less than 1 second confirming the efficiency of the approach.
Remark 2. Let us observe that taking w > uu+1(n−k) implies for tpub to be very small since we have
tpub 6
1
2
(n− w − k) <
1
2
(
n− k
u+ 1
)
. (24)
For instance, with parameters proposed in [Loi07] we would have tpub 6 3. Consequently the values
of n, k andm have to be changed so that general decoding attacks fail [GRS16]. Let us notice that this
situation is quite similar to the counter-measures proposed in [RGH10, Loi10] to resist to Overbeck’s
attack. But the strength of this reparation deserves a thorough analysis.
TABLE 1. Bound on w with parameters taken from [Loi07] (m = n).
n k u w uu+1(n− k)
56 28 3 16 21
54 32 4 13 17
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Algorithm 1 Key recovery of Faure-Loidreau scheme where the public key is (G,K)
1: {γ1, . . . , γu} ← arbitrary basis of L viewed as a linear space over Fqm
2: for all 1 6 i 6 u do
3: Ki ← TrL/Fqm (γiK)
4: end for
5: Let Cpub ⊂ F
n
qm be the code generated byGpub ⊲Gpub is defined as in (18)
6: if dimΛn−w−k−1(Cpub)
⊥ = 1 then
7: Pick at random h˜ ∈ Λn−w−k−1(Cpub)
⊥
8: Compute T ∈ GLn(Fq) and h
′ ∈ Fn−wqm such that
h˜(T−1)T =
(
0 | h′
)
9: K∗ ← KT ⊲ K∗ = (K∗1, . . . ,K
∗
n) ∈ L
n
10: G∗ ← GT ⊲G∗ = (g∗i,j) ∈ Mk,n (Fqm)
11: Solve the linear system where (X1, . . . ,Xk) are the unknowns
(L) :


K∗w+1 = g
∗
1,w+1X1 + · · · + g
∗
k,w+1Xk
...
K∗n = g
∗
1,nX1 + · · · + g
∗
k,nXk
12: z← K− xG where x is the unique solution of (L)
13: end if
14: return (x, z)
6. CONCLUSION
Faure and Loidreau proposed a rank-metric encryption scheme based on Gabidulin codes related to
the problem of the linearized polynomial reconstruction. We showed that the scheme is vulnerable
to a polynomial-time key recovery attack by using Overbeck’s techniques applied on an appropriate
public code.
Our attack assumes that parameters are chosen so that w 6 uu+1 (n− k) which was always the case
in [FL05, Loi07]. We have also seen that taking w > uu+1 (n− k) implies to choose tpub <
1
2
(
n−k
u+1
)
which exposes further the system to general decoding attacks like [GRS16]. Hence it imposes to
increase the key sizes and consequently reduces the practicability of the scheme while offering no
assurance that the scheme is still secure. The best choice from a designer’s point of view would be
to take u as small as possible but a thorough analysis has to be undertaken in light of the connections
with the reparations proposed in [RGH10, Loi10]. This point is left as an open question in our paper
and breaking this kind of parameters would lead arguably to a cryptanalysis of [RGH10, Loi10], and
to an algorithm that decodes Gabidulin codes beyond the bound uu+1 (n− k).
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